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The rhetoric and reality of SME-friendly procurement  
Anthony Flynn and Paul Davis 
Dublin City University, Ireland  
Abstract 
SME-friendly policies are central to public procurement. The extent to which these policies have been put into practice has 
gone largely untested, particularly from a SME perspective. To address this gap a survey of “MEs’ ƌepoƌted eǆpeƌieŶĐes of 
policy implementation was conducted. Ireland served as the research context. The findings indicate that policy 
implementation has been limited. Firm size is found to be a significant predictor of SMEs’ experiences, with micro-
enterprises more negative than small or medium-sized enterprises. Reasons for the observed policy-practice divide as well 
as recommendations for its improvement are discussed.  
Introduction 
To increase small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) participation in public procurement governments are becoming 
more proactive. In the European Union (EU), for example, a Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public 
Procurement was adopted in 2008 (European Commission, 2008). Similar initiatives are to be found in other regions and 
countries. So-called SME-friendly policies form part of a more overarching agenda that aims to leverage public 
procurement in support of small enterprise development (Preuss, 2011). The translation of policy into everyday 
procurement practice is a prerequisite for the achievement of this goal. Surprisingly, there remains a dearth of evidence 
on whether SME-friendly policy has translated into practice. Absent of evidence on policy implementation it can be said 
that we know more about the rhetoric of SME-friendly procurement than we do about the reality. In a recent commentary 
on UK procurement policy Murray (2012, p. 1ϲϳͿ eĐhoed this ǀieǁ, poiŶtiŶg out that ͞…..there is an enormous chasm 
between saying something will, or should, happen and it actually happening͟. “ME-friendly policy is no exception to this 
maxim. The fact that SME support measures are adopted by central government and promoted to public sector 
organizations does not mean that the public tendering landscape will transform itself. Research by Loader (2011) into 
puďliĐ ďuǇeƌs’ efforts to act on SME-friendly policy shows this to be the case.   
The importance of differentiating policy aspiration from procurement practice cannot be overstated. It is the latter that 
ultiŵatelǇ deteƌŵiŶes “MEs’ likelihood of iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ public sector competitions. As Fee et al. (2002) identified, “MEs’ 
frustration with public procurement is more likely to be attributable to the behaviours and actions of public buyers than 
policies per se. This relates back to Beyer et al.’s (1983, p. 229) observation that ͞…ƌeal puďliĐ poliĐǇ is ŵade duƌiŶg its 
execution by implementers and not during its formation by decision makers͟. The oďjeĐtiǀe of this papeƌ is to examine 
SME-friendly policy in practice. “MEs’ experiences of barriers in public sector tendering have been documented across 
many jurisdictions, including Ireland (Flynn et al. 2013), the United Kingdom (Loader, 2005), the United States (McManus, 
1991) and Australia (Purchase et al. 2009). We build on this line of inquiry by capturing “MEs’ experiences of policy 
measures designed to lessen these same barriers. Our results imply that SME-friendly policy has yet to become embedded 
in everyday procurement practice. The next section reviews existing research on SMEs and public procurement. Following 
on, the data collection method is described. “MEs’ ƌepoƌted eǆpeƌieŶĐes aƌe then analysed. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of why policy has not translated into practice and the steps that can be taken to address this problem.   
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Research to date  
That SMEs experience challenges when competing in the market for public sector contracts is long established. These 
challenges include bureaucracy, inaccessible public buyers, too much weighting on cost (Cabras, 2011), lack of knowledge 
over how to source opportunities or navigate tendering procedures (Greer, 1999; Loader, 2005, 2007), onerous tender 
documentation and unprofessional procurement staff (Fee et al. 2002), time demands and financial costs of tendering and 
requirements for previous relevant experience (Flynn et al. 2013), slow payments, narrow bid specifications, difficulties in 
engaging with end users (McManus, 1991) and large contract sizes and information asymmetries (Bovis, 1996). The 
evidence suggests that the very nature of public sector tendering and SME resource limitations combine to stymie SMEs 
(Loader, 2013). In turn, this translates into participation and success rates that do not reflect “MEs’ weighting in the 
economy (GHK, 2010). 
SME-friendly policies are an attempt to reduce many of the barriers cited above and correct for the disadvantage SMEs 
experience relative to large firms when tendering (Anglund, 1999). While policies of this type are not new – Promoting 
SME Participation in Public Procurement in The Community was adopted by the European Commission in 1990 - the 
agenda for SME involvement in public procurement has become more salient in recent years. Increased appreciation of 
the “MEs’ value as suppliers to public sector organizations (Loader, 2005), greater awareness of how public procurement 
can be leveraged in the interests of SME growth (Preuss, 2011) and the impact of the 2007 financial crisis (Murray, 2009) 
explain this effect. While policy has sought to tackle the main barriers facing SMEs, it has not gone so far as to discriminate 
in their favour (Kidalov and Snider, 2011). Instead the emphasis has been on creating equality of access for all potential 
suppliers, which is consistent with the sentiments of both public buyers and suppliers. The former have been found to 
favour this approach as it does not undermine the principle of open competition (Qiao et al. 2009) and suppliers have 
been shown only to want a less bureaucratic tendering process (Glover, 2008). 
The importance attached to facilitating SMEs in public procurement notwithstanding, there is reason to believe that 
making it a reality will prove challenging.  A number of studies have averred to the uneasy mix of policies and competing 
agendas that govern the procurement field (Erridge, 2007; Fee, 2002; Pickernell et al. 2011; Schapper et al. 2006). In 
practice this means that public buyers are under pressure to maximize value for money while complying with laws and 
directives and supporting socio-economic goals. With regard to SME-friendly policy specifically, cost saving pressures have 
been shown to limit the ability and inclination of buyers to implement it (Cabras, 2011; Loader, 2007, 2011). The general 
oďseƌǀatioŶ has ďeeŶ that ͞…ǁhile pƌoĐuƌeŵeŶt officers would like to do business with small firms, in practice their 
pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵ is to aĐhieǀe ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ͟ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϳ, p. 313). The goals of efficiency, compliance and socio-economic 
objectives are not mutually exclusive, as Erridge and Hennigan (201ϮͿ haǀe ƌeĐeŶtlǇ deŵoŶstƌated, ďut ͞ƌegulaƌitǇ 
aŵďiguitǇ͟ presents difficulties for buyers (Morgan, 2008, p. 1246). Under such circumstances the implementation of 
SME-friendly policy is far from guaranteed. 
Data collection 
To examine SME-friendly policy implementation data was obtained from SMEs competing in the Irish public sector 
marketplace in December, 2013. As the intended policy targets SMEs are ideally placed to assess if SME-friendly policies 
have translated into practice. The selection of SMEs as key respondents is further justified as research to date has 
privileged ďuǇeƌs’ ǀieǁs oǀeƌ those of other public procurement actors (Murray, 2009a). The data gathering process 
involved e-surveying the population of supplieƌs ƌegisteƌed oŶ IƌelaŶd’s ŶatioŶal public procurement portal. Adopting this 
approach ensured direct access to SMEs competing for public sector contracts. The survey instrument was initially piloted 
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with 20 Irish SMEs and designed in line with the best practice recommendations of Dillman (2007) in terms of design, 
length and user-friendliness. The research objective was to capture data on “MEs’ experiences of measures articulated in 
Facilitating SME Access to Public Sector Contracts, which was by the Irish government in 2010 (Department of Finance, 
2010). Among the measures it contains are the division of contracts into lots, proportionality and relevance in the use of 
qualification criteria, openness to SME consortium bidding, and ensuring that suppliers only have to initially declare their 
ability to satisfy financial capacity and insurance cover requirements. Approximately three-years had elapsed between 
policy adoption in 2010 and our testing of its implementation in 2013.  
Political impetus for a more SME-friendly public procurement regime in Ireland resulted from a sharp economic 
contraction in 2007.  SMEs were hit particularly hard, as data from the European Commission (2011) proves. Between 
ϮϬϬϳ aŶd ϮϬϭϬ “MEs’ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the Iƌish eĐoŶoŵǇ fell fiǀe peƌĐeŶtage poiŶts fƌoŵ ϱϯ peƌĐent to 48 percent, 
employment reduced by 15 percent and final output decreased by 18 percent. All this had the effect of galvanising 
political efforts to leverage public procurement for SMEs’ ďeŶefit. At the same time cutting public sector expenditure 
became an overriding political priority, and public procurement was identified as having a key contribution to make in 
delivering savings. Included among the various cost saving initiatives was a roll-out of national purchasing framework 
agreements designed to exploit economies of scale (NPPPU, 2009). In sum, adverse economic conditions in Ireland from 
2007 onwards brought about simultaneous attempts to open-up the public procurement market to SMEs and to achieve 
cost savings in public purchasing.  
Description of respondents 
The data collection phase generated responses from 5816 firms. As an estimated 60,000 suppliers were registered on 
IƌelaŶd’s puďliĐ pƌoĐuƌeŵeŶt poƌtal at the time of the survey, the response rate approximates to 10 percent. The data was 
screened prior to analysis and substantially incomplete surveys were removed. The total number of incomplete responses 
was 2553, which left 3263 completed surveys. Large firms i.e. firms with 250 or more employees were excluded as they 
were not relevant for the purposes of the study. The total number of large firms was 253. The final usable SME sample 
was 3010. The characteristics of the 3010 SMEs are summarised in Table 1. The majority are micro enterprises, measured 
by the number of full-time employees. Reported turnover figures are consistent with this observation. Over seven out of 
ten SMEs reported annual revenues of less than €2 million. In terms of age, 42 percent have been operating for less than 
ten years and 58 percent that have been operating for more than ten years. The majority of firms either fall into the 
category of limited company or sole trader. The five main industries in which firms compete are professional & 
consultancy services (26 percent), construction (15 percent), information technology (11 percent), engineering (7 percent) 
and wholesale & retail (6 percent). Four out of five firms are domiciled in Ireland. In order of importance, the remainder is 
found in Britain, Northern Ireland, Europe, and Rest of World. Almost half of the firms compete at national level, 32 
percent at sub-national level (local or regional markets), and 18 percent in international markets. The sample firms have 
on average eleven years of public sector tendering experience.   
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Table 1 SME Respondent Characteristics 
 
 
 
No. of 
Employees 
Frequency 
 
 
% 
 
1-9 1889 62.8 
10-49 760 25.2 
50-249 361 12.0 
Total 3010 100 
 
 
Age Frequency 
 
% 
 
0-5 years 716 24 
6-10 years 529 17.7 
11-20 years 760 25.5 
21+ years 980 32.8 
Total 2985 100 
 
 
Tendering 
Experience 
 
Frequency 
 
% 
 
0-2 years  756 25.1 
3-6 years 768 25.5 
7-13 years 722 24 
14+ years 764 25.4 
Total 3010 100 
 
 
TuƌŶoǀeƌ ;€Ϳ Frequency 
 
% 
 
< 2 mi
lion 2180 72.8 
2-10 million 537 17.9 
10-50 million 232 7.8 
50 million+ 44 1.5 
Total 2993 100 
 
 
 
Country Frequency 
 
% 
 
Ireland 2400 79.9 
Northern Ire. 134 4.5 
Britain 334 11.1 
EU 80 2.7 
Rest of World 55 1.8 
Total 3003 100 
 
 
Firm Type 
 
Frequency 
 
 
% 
 Sole trader 710 23.7 
Partnership 132 4.4 
Ltd  2094 69.8 
Unlimited  37 1.2 
Charity 27 .9 
Total 3000 100 
 
Results 
“MEs’ ƌeported experiences of policy implementation are reported in this section. All variables used in the analysis are 
listed in the Appendix. Analysis of “MEs’ reported experiences by size, age, and tendering experience was also 
undertaken. Previous research by Flynn et al. (2013a), Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008) and Pickernell et al. (2011) has 
found SME size to be a significant predictor of tendering behaviour and outcomes. Firm age and tendering experience 
have also been linked to tendering outcomes (GHK, 2010). A three-way ANOVA that combines size, age, and tendering 
experience was used for interval and scale variables aŶd PeaƌsoŶ’s Chi “Ƌuaƌe test was used for categorical variables.  
SMEs were questioned about their knowledge of Irish SME-friendly policy. The majority of SMEs were found not to be 
familiar with policy in place for their benefit. Seventy-seven percent claimed to be unaware as against the 23 percent who 
were aware. SME size (p <.05) was found to be a significant predictor of policy familiarity. Micro-enterprises evinced a 
lower level of policy familiarity than either small or medium-sized enterprises. Tendering experience (p <.05) was also 
significant. SMEs with low levels of tendering experience were less aware of SME-friendly policy than SMEs with high 
levels of tendering experience. Age was not a significant predictor of policy awareness (p = .157).  
SMEs were asked if it was their experience that four key SME-friendly measures had been implemented. The four 
measures were (i) division of contracts into lots (ii) ďuǇeƌs’ flexibility over proof of financial capacity (iii) the use of relevant 
and proportionate qualification Đƌiteƌia ;iǀͿ aŶd ďuǇeƌs’ opeŶŶess to “ME ĐoŶsoƌtiuŵ ďiddiŶg. The ƌesults iŶdiĐate that 
implementation has been limited (Table 2). On all four measures the percentage of SMEs that expressed a negative view is 
greater than the percentage that expressed a positive view. BuǇeƌs’ flexibility over the type of financial proof sought is the 
least implemented measure, followed by the use of relevant and proportionate qualification criteria. In addition to 
expressed negative assessment, a significant percentage of SMEs were unsure as to whether each of the four measures 
had been implemented.  
On the first measure, dividing contracts into lots, 34 percent of SMEs did not agree that it had been implemented and 39 
percent were unsure. Only 27 percent agreed that efforts have been made to divide large contracts into smaller lots. An 
even more negative assessment was given on ďuǇeƌs’ flexibility over proof of financial capacity. Forty-two percent stated 
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that they had experienced little flexibility on the part of buyers versus 25 percent who stated the opposite and 33 percent 
who were unsure. In respect of the third measure, the use of relevant and proportionate qualification criteria, 39 percent 
did not believe that it had been put into practice versus the 36 percent who answered in the affirmative. Approximately 
25 percent were unsure. On the fourth and final measure, openness to SME consortium bidding, 32 percent stated that it 
had not been implemented, 22 percent stated that it had been implemented, and 45 percent were unsure.    
Table 2 Reported Experience of SME-friendly Measures 
Policy Measure Strongly 
Disagree% 
Disagree% Not 
Sure% 
Agree% Strongly 
Agree% 
Contracts are split into lots 14.5 19.4 38.8 18.8 8.6 
Procurers are flexible in the type of proof 
of financial capacity they accept 
16.5 25.5 33.1 19.5 5.4 
Pre-qualification criteria are relevant & proportionate 16.2 22.8 24.3 28.2 8.3 
SME consortium bidding is encouraged 11.7 20.4 45.7 17.7 4.5 
  
 
Further statistical analysis was carried out to determine if size, age, aŶd teŶdeƌiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐe pƌediĐted “MEs’ ƌepoƌted 
experiences (Table 3). SME size was found to be significant in respect of three of the four key measures: division of 
contracts into lots (F (2, 2895) = 3.194, p<.05, flexibility over proof of financial capacity (F (2, 2892) = 4.9, p <.05 and the 
use of relevant and proportionate qualification criteria (F (2, 2891) = 7.9, p <.05.  For each of these three measures post 
hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between micro and small enterprises (p<.05) and micro and medium-
sized enterprises (p <.05) but not between small and medium-sized enterprises. Neither “MEs’ age nor tendering 
experience acted as predictors for these thƌee ŵeasuƌes. OŶ the fouƌth ŵeasuƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ďuǇeƌs’ opeŶŶess to “ME 
consortium bidding tendering experience was significant (F (3, 2880) = 3.074, p <.05. SME size was slightly outside the 
level of acceptable significance (F (2, 2880) = 2.583, p = .076 and age was not significant (F (3, 2880) = .224, p =.880. 
 
Taďle ϯ “uŵŵaƌǇ of FaĐtoƌ EffeĐts oŶ “MEs’ Repoƌted EǆpeƌieŶĐes  
 Sig. Sig.  Sig. Sig 
Variable SME Size SME Age SME Tendering 
Experience 
Size* Age* Tendering 
Experience 
Division of contracts 
into lots 
 .041 .896 .113 X 
Flexibility over proof 
of financial capacity 
 .008 .467 .161   
Relevant & 
proportionate criteria 
 .000 .407 .585 X 
SME consortium 
bidding 
.076 .880  .027 X 
e-sourcing .098 .873 .508 X 
 
Implementation of measures relating to financial capacity and insurance cover declarations were also tested.  These 
measures state that SMEs should only have to declare at the initial tendering stage that they satisfy financial capacity and 
insurance cover criteria. The analysis suggests that these measures have translated into practice to a moderate degree 
(Table 4). Fifty-nine percent of SMEs stated that a declaration of financial capacity was all that was requested of them at 
the initial competition stage and 61 percent claimed the same in respect of declaring their insurance cover. Firm size (p 
<.05) and tendering experience (p <.05) were found to act as significant predictors in respect of only having to make a 
declaration of financial capacity. Micro-enterprises and SMEs with little tendering experience were less likely to have had 
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the benefit of this measure than small or medium-sized enterprises and firms with high levels of tendering experience. 
Age was marginally outside the level of significance (p = .056). Tendering experience was also significant (p <.05) in 
eǆplaiŶiŶg “MEs’ ƌepoƌted eǆpeƌieŶĐes oŶ deĐlaƌatioŶs of iŶsuƌaŶĐe Đoǀeƌ. Again, inexperienced SMEs were less likely to 
have benefited from this measure (54 percent) compared to experienced SMEs (63 percent). SME size (p = .162) and age 
(p = .234) were not found to be significant predictors. A summary of these effects, along with awareness of SME policy, is 
given in Table 5.  
Table 4 Reported Experiences of Financial Capacity and Insurance Cover Measures 
Policy Measure Yes 
% 
No 
% 
At the initial tendering stage my firm only has to declare that its meets the financial capacity criteria  59 41 
At the initial tendering stage my firm only has to declare that it has adequate insurance cover  61 39 
 
The open advertising of all contracts worth €25,000 or greater on IƌelaŶd’s ŶatioŶal e-procurement portal is another 
strand of SME-friendly policy. To gauge the implementation of this measure SMEs were asked the percentage of contracts 
they tendered for over the last three years that were identified via this portal. On average 58 percent of contracts were 
identified by SMEs online (std. dev. 40.86). The median figure was 75 percent, which indicates that half of SMEs e-source 
three out of every four contracts. Additional analysis found that e-sourcing within the SME population was not contingent 
on size (p = .098), age (p = .873) or level of tendering experience (p = .508).  
 
Table 5 Awareness and Experience of SME-friendly Measures 
Variable Pearson’s Chi “Ƌuaƌe Cƌaŵeƌ’s V Sig. 
Size and awareness of SME-
friendly policy 
11.54 .062 .003 
Age and awareness of SME-
friendly policy 
5.205 .042 .157 
Tendering experience and 
awareness of SME-friendly 
policy 
40.19 .116 .000 
Size and declaration of 
financial capacity 
13.32 .068 .001 
Size and declaration of 
insurance cover 
3.635 .035 .162 
Age and declaration of 
financial capacity 
7.57 
 
.051 
 
.056 
 
Age and declaration of 
insurance cover 
4.26 
 
.039 
 
.234 
 
Tendering experience and 
declaration of financial 
capacity 
17.57 
 
.078 
 
.001 
 
Tendering experience and 
declaration of insurance 
cover 
13.97 
 
.069 .003 
 
Discussion and implications 
SMEs have become central to debate over public procurement, as evidenced by growth in the number and sophistication 
of policy measures aimed at supporting them. The question posed here was whether these same policy measures have 
tƌaŶslated iŶto pƌaĐtiĐe. Based oŶ “MEs’ ƌepoƌted eǆpeƌieŶĐes it appeaƌs that theƌe is a suďstaŶtial gap ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat 
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legislators and policy makers say should happen as regards facilitating SMEs and what actually happens in practice. As has 
been found with other aspects of procurement policy, including sustainability (Morgan, 2008; Walker and Brammer, 2009) 
and third sector commissioning (Murray, 2011), it is evident that the political and policy rhetoric over facilitating SMEs has 
not been matched by the behaviour and actions of public buyers. The division of contracts into lots, flexibility over proof 
of financial capacity, relevant and proportionate qualification criteria, and openness to consortium bidding are among the 
key policy initiatives designed to make public procurement more accessible to SMEs. Yet it is the experience of SMEs that 
these measures have not been put into practice in any systematic way. OŶ the ďasis of “MEs’ ƌepoƌted eǆpeƌieŶĐes 
procurement practice continues to lag policy pronouncements. So long as this situation persists public sector tendering 
will continue to be problematic for small suppliers.  
The policy-practice divide was found to be most pronounced in the case of micro-enterprises. More than small or 
medium-sized firms, micro-enterprises report that support measures are not being implemented. This is a significant 
finding as it is the micro-enterprise cohort which is the principal target of policy support and, numerically, the dominant 
enterprise type in the economy. That their reported experiences are statistically different from both small and medium-
sized enterprises suggests the need for a re-assessment of SME-friendly policy. The findings of this study imply that its 
impact is being felt by bigger SMEs more so than enterprises with only a few employees. While not as important as size 
“MEs’ teŶdeƌiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐe also acts as a predictor on several measures. These include accommodating consortium bids 
and only having to declare financial capacity and insurance cover at the initial competition phase. The inference drawn is 
that more experienced firms are benefiting to a greater extent from SME-friendly policy than firms relatively new to 
tendering. The findings are not wholly negative, however, and some progress has been made, particularly on the 
recommendation that contracts valued at €25,000 and above are openly advertised on IƌelaŶd’s e-procurement portal so 
as to increase their visibility to SMEs.   
Several factors are relevant when explaining the observed gap between SME-friendly policy rhetoric and procurement 
practice. Firstly, implementing SME-friendly policy is only one of a number of demands made of public sector buyers 
(Erridge, 2007; Schapper et al. 2006). IŶ IƌelaŶd’s Đase puďliĐ ďuǇeƌs aƌe also uŶdeƌ oďligatioŶ to purchase from central 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk agƌeeŵeŶts, ǁhiĐh aƌe ͞….taƌgeted at seĐuƌiŶg ďest ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ aŶd faĐilitatiŶg ĐoŶtƌaĐtiŶg authoƌities to 
deliver services within their budgetaƌǇ ĐoŶstƌaiŶts͟ ;DepaƌtŵeŶt of PuďliĐ EǆpeŶdituƌe aŶd Refoƌŵ, ϮϬϭ3, p. 1). As Loader 
(2007, 2011) has already demonstrated, a value for money imperative and an emphasis on demand aggregation is likely to 
undermine attempts to divide contracts into lots, encourage consortium bidding or accommodate smaller suppliers. The 
necessity of reducing public expenditure as a condition of its financial rescue by international creditors in 2010 is likely to 
have amplified this effect in Ireland. Secondly, facilitating SMEs is morally governed unlike, for example, EU Public 
Procurement Directives which impose legal obligations on public buyers. The latter will always take precedence whenever 
conflicts of interests arise.  
Thirdly, a lack of professionalism in public purchasing can impede SME-friendly policy implementation, as it can with the 
implementation of procurement policy generally (Morgan, 2008). It should not be forgotten that public buyers are policy 
implementers (Beyer et al. 1983) and the successful realisation of SME-friendly policy, or any other procurement policy, 
depends on the individual skills and motivation of buyers as well as the organization support structures available to them 
(Coggburn and Rahm, 2005; Soudry, 2007). If one or more of these elements is missing policy implementation suffers. 
Fourthly, the possibility that a not sufficient time period had elapsed for policy to take full effect cannot be discounted. 
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While our study allowed for a three-year gap between policy adoption and the testing of its implementation, it might be 
that a longer time period is required for SME-friendly procurement to become fully embedded in practice.     
A number of implications for SME-friendly procurement arise from this paper. In the first instance there is an onus on 
central government to give clearer direction to public buyers on what they should prioritise and how they should act. If 
maximising value for money is the overriding imperative, then the consequences for the SME agenda in public 
procurement need to be acknowledged. A confused mix of procurement policy is not in the interest of any public 
procurement stakeholder. A clear sense of purpose should also extend to the policy formulation stage and new 
procurement policies should not undermine current policy directives. A second onus on central government is to 
professionalize purchasing across the public sector. So long as purchasing is carried out on an ad hoc basis by public 
servants principally employed in other roles, as observed by Flynn et al. (2013), then the likelihood of policy translating 
into practice is slim. In contrast, having a cadre of dedicated buyers with the requisite qualifications, commercial 
experience and organizational support will lead to more value-adding purchasing across the public sector (McCue and 
Gianakis, 2001).  
Emerging from the findings is a lack of policy awareness on the part of SMEs, which is suggestive of a failure of 
communication on the part of central government. SME-friendly policy needs to be widely promoted to the business 
community and their representative bodies, and not just to public sector organizations. A more informed SME population 
will be better positioned to judge if public buyers are adhering to their policy obligations. In itself this could act as an 
upward pressure on public sector organizations and their buyers to become more responsive to small suppliers. Finally, a 
reassessment of generic SME-friendly policy is advisable in light of the finding that micro-enterprises seem to benefiting 
less from its implementation than larger SMEs. SMEs are a heterogeneous group when it comes to public sector tendering 
and policy should reflect this fact (Flynn et al. 2013a; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008). The findings presented here 
raise challenging questions for all those with an interest in making public procurement more conducive to SME 
participation. They do, however, represent a particular perspective, that of SMEs who find themselves vying for business 
in an increasingly competitive market. Going forward, evidence on puďliĐ ďuǇeƌs’ ƌepoƌted ďehaǀiouƌs is needed so as to 
arrive at a balanced assessment of the extent of SME-friendly policy implementation.  
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Appendix 1: List of variables and their operationalization 
Variable Measure  Scale 
   
SME Size Number of employees Micro (1-9) 
Small (10-49) 
Medium (50-249) 
 
SME Age How long is the firm established  0-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-20 years 
21+ years  
 
SME Tendering Experience Number of years tendering for public 
sector contracts 
0-2 years 
3-6 years 
7-13 years 
14+ years 
 
Policy Awareness Awareness of SME-friendly policy  Yes 
No 
 
Declaration of Financial Capacity    Only have to declare financial capacity 
initially 
Yes 
No 
 
Declaration of Insurance Cover Only have to declare insurance cover 
initially  
Yes 
No 
 
Division of Contracts into Lots Contracts are divided into lots in order 
to facilitate SME access 
5 point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree-
Agree) 
Flexibility over Proof of Financial 
Capacity 
Buyers are flexible over proof of 
financial capacity  
5 point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree-
Agree) 
Relevant and Proportionate 
Qualification Criteria 
Qualification criteria are relevant and 
proportionate  
5 point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree-
Agree) 
Openness to SME Consortium Bidding Buyers are open to consortium bidding 5 point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree-
Agree) 
 
e-Sourcing Percentage of contracts sourced 
online over the last three years 
0-100% 
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